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Abstract
This article examines the role of non-ﬁnancial interest groups in EU ﬁnancial regulatory decision-
making. While regulatory capture theories clearly helped identify the causes for the incrementality
in spite of the major shock the 2008 crisis had caused, this article will consider a range of regulatory
policy initiatives that do not neatly conform with this theory. I examine the extent to which non-
ﬁnancial groups are able to have their preferences met in the making of three different consumer
policies: the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD), stricter regulations of retail investment products
(PRIPs/KID) and the reform of EU level supervisory structures. By employing a process-tracing ap-
proach based on qualitative interviews to analyze political responses to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the
article demonstrates that newly mobilized groups could translate key advocacy goals into policy by
deploying counter-expertise and co-operating with policy-makers in some cases but not in others.
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Introduction
Similarly to the US reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the EU agreed on a series of
reform proposals that signiﬁcantly altered the regulatory architecture of European ﬁnan-
cial regulation and deepened the single market in ﬁnancial services. Although there is
no overarching initiative in the EU that would be comparable to the Dodd-Frank Act,
the European Commission brought forward more than 40 measures to reform its ﬁnancial
architecture in response to the crisis (Moloney,2012). Existing IPE (International political
economy) scholarship has largely focused on explaining patterns of incrementalism of EU
level regulatory responses. Speciﬁcally, IPE scholars have attributed the incremental
nature of regulatory reforms at EU level to the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial-sector groups and
their lobbying efforts aimed at preventing regulation (Buckley and Howarth,2010). The
literature thereby echoed the popular capture narrative. This narrative has also been
fed by media accounts of ‘extremely vigorous’ lobbying pressure from ﬁnancial
service-sector lobbyists during reform debates in Brussels (Hoedeman, 2009).
There is no doubt that consumer advocacy groups were largely outnumbered by industry
sector lobbyists during reform debates. According to a recent study conducted by a Brussels-
based NGO entitled the ‘The Firepower of the Financial Lobby’, ﬁnancial industry groups
had seven times more encounters with EU institutions than NGOs, trade unions and con-
sumer organizations taken together (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014a). The ﬁnancial
industry clearly also had much more material resources at its disposal than civil society
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groups. In 18months between its foundation and December 2012, Finance Watch, a newly
found Brussels-based NGO lobbying on ﬁnancial reform spent €330,000 on communica-
tions, meetings and research (FinanceWatch,2013). In 2012, the Deutsche Bank alone spent
about € 1,990,000 on lobbying for ﬁnancial reforms at EU level.1
The goal of this analysis is to subject claims of regulatory capture in EU ﬁnancial
regulatory decision-making to more vigorous empirical scrutiny. By covering EU
institutions, the present analysis takes on the empirical basis for regulatory capture
arguments above the level of national policy-making. To date only a few studies have
engaged with regulatory capture theories on international levels of governance (see for
example, Chalmers,2015; Young,2012).
The empirical account draws on more than 70 elite interviews with industry
representatives, civil society groups and policy-makers in Brussels between July 2011
and May 2013, as well as publicly available secondary sources such as newspaper articles
and academic and professional publications about ﬁnancial reforms. First, the article gives
an overview of common theoretical perspectives. In section II, I demonstrate regulatory
change that occurred with respect to consumer ﬁnance protection at EU level, assessing
the extent to which diffuse interest groups saw their preferences met in the reform
outcome.2 I show that private sector groups were not successful in preventing regulatory
change despite their lobbying efforts. Going into greater detail about the role of newly
mobilized non-ﬁnancial groups, the present research will focus on a simple question:
how can interest groups, usually considered as weak and peripheral in the context of
ﬁnance, such as consumer associations, successfully have their preferences met in
ﬁnancial reforms despite the opposition of the ﬁnancial industry that seeks to preserve
the status quo? In section III, I describe the general post-crisis environment in which
interest groups’ lobbying took place and conduct detailed processanalyses of three
regulatory policies enacted at EU level in response to the crisis, examining advocacy ef-
forts of organized diffuse interest groups over the content of the proposed reform policies.
In section IV, I will summarize the ﬁndings of the case studies before I brieﬂy conclude.
In the case studies on theMortgage Credit Directive (MCD) and stricter regulations of retail
investment products (PRIPs/KID), I demonstrate that, despite a socio-institutional environ-
ment thought to be conducive to private sector inﬂuence, the inﬂuence of industry groups
was more circumscribed and newly mobilized groups managed to translate some of their
key advocacy goals into policy. In the third case study on the reform of supervisory structures,
I demonstrate that efforts by advocacy groups to strengthen the consumer mandate largely
failed. By asking why and how diffuse interests came to be represented in some policies,
but not in others, we can start to single out the underlying mechanisms of diffuse interest rep-
resentation in ﬁnancial regulation. The starting point of the analysis is the preliminary policy
response to the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, while the end point is roughly the end of the reform
negotiations and the signing into law of reforms in 2014. Subsequent research will have to un-
pack the full implementation process of the ﬁnancial reforms enacted in response to the crisis.
1 See European Transparency Register, available online at: ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consulta-tion/
displaylobbyist.do?id = 271912611231–56.
2 Evidence of inﬂuence or lobbying success of an interest group would be if ‘a speciﬁc proposal articulated as part of a lob-
bying effort can be shown to have made its way into actual regulatory policy’ (Young, 2012, p. 671). If, for instance, an
item survives the policy agenda in spite of industry lobbying opposed to it, this evidence would be an empirical indicator
for failed industry capture.
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Theoretical Approaches
In this section I will brieﬂy review the most common theoretical perspectives on EU
ﬁnancial reform politics. A more ‘pluralistic’ view of ﬁnancial reform making that takes
into account the role of non-ﬁnancial actors in shaping regulatory reform helps to under-
stand reform cases where well-funded industry groups did not get what they wanted.
Capture Theories
Regulatory capture, a process whereby narrow industry interests are favoured at the
expense of the more diffuse public interest, has arguably become the most popular
theoretical concept to analyze post-crisis ﬁnancial reform-making (Pagliari,2012,
p. 6).3 This interpretation was echoed by many observers, who argued that national
and international reform efforts after the crisis were considerably watered down or scaled
back by private-sector lobbies (Helleiner etal., 2010; Moschella and Tsingou,2013).
Political scientists studying post-crisis reforms in the EU, recorded incremental change
with much activity but relatively little change (Moschella, 2014; Moschella and Tsingou,
2013). However, due to the assumption of regulatory capture, scholars have neglected to
systematically examine reform cases where industry groups did not succeed. This bias is
particularly true for scholarship unfolding in response to the ﬁnancial crisis. Buckley and
Howarth (2010, p. 137), for instance, attribute the incremental nature of reforms largely to
successful lobbying of domestic ﬁnancial industries aimed at preventing regulation.
Tsingou (2010)testiﬁes to the persistence of the inﬂuence of a transnational policy
network of ﬁnancial experts. Emphasizing ‘close ﬁnancial, personal and ideological ties’
between policy-makers and the banking industry, Johnson and Kwak (2011, p. 12) argue
that Wall Street returned to ‘business as usual’ after the crisis, with its political inﬂuence
in Washington as powerful as ever. Admati and Hellwig (2013, p. 3), two renowned
economists, argue that ‘despite the enormous damage of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09,
the effort to reform the ﬁnancial system has been stymied’. While capture theories give
us clues why reform efforts were rather incremental despite the major shock of the crisis,
they are ill-equipped to explain cases where resourceful private sector groups were not
able to translate their preferences into policy.
Salience in EU Politics
Highlighting the role of public salience, scholars increasingly emphasize that electoral
contingencies and public opinion are causal factors that inﬂuenced post-crisis ﬁnancial
reform-makers (see, for example,Pagliari,2013). These studiesemphasize populist
pressures on policy-makers together with an increased awareness of the distributional
consequences of regulatory failures due to the crisis as driving factors for more stringent
regulation of the ﬁnancial sector. A small but growing number of studies testify that the
crisis was a catalyst in changing interest groups dynamics in regard to ﬁnancial regula-
tion. Woll (2013) argues that regulatory reform had become susceptible to public outrage
which forced ﬁnancial industry lobbyists, in this case the hedge fund industry, to adapt
3 Regulatory capture is here understood to be occurring ‘when bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve some
notion of a wider collective public interest and begin to systematically favour speciﬁc vested interests, usually the very in-
terests they were supposed to regulate and restrain for the wider public interest’ (Baker, 2010, p. 648).
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their strategies to governments’ preferences in order to be successful. Recent research has
also shown that altered social relations within the ﬁnancial policy network considerably
weakened the industry’s capacity to veto or block reform proposals. Young (2013) ﬁnds
that increased issue salience was accompanied by a qualitative shift in policy-making with
decision-makers becoming more reluctant to exchange information with industry groups
and overall communication levels dropping signiﬁcantly. Adjusting to these shifts the ﬁ-
nancial industry changed its advocacy strategy putting more emphasis on self-regulatory
moves and delaying implementation instead of vetoing policy proposals (Young,2014).
Steinlin and Trampusch (2012, p. 256) ﬁnd that under political pressure banks were afraid
of reputational repercussions and therefore refrained from using their veto possibilities to
block change. Accounts that base their explanations of post-crisis regulatory reforms on
salience as sole explanatory factor, do however neglect the agency of newly mobilized
pro-reform forces. Most of the accounts above emphasize changed dynamics within the
ﬁnancial community with little attention paid to societal counter-mobilization from the
bottom-up. Also, while salience arguments hinge on empirical evidence of increased
public attention, EU-level consumer protection reforms did not attract much interest
among a wider public.
A Pluralist Perspective
Recent insights from political economy suggest that the mobilization of outsider groups
as a ‘countervailing force’ had signiﬁcant effects on the regulatory design of post-crisis
ﬁnancial reforms (Clapp and Helleiner,2012; Kastner, 2014;Orban, 2016; Pagliari and
Young,2014; Woolley and Ziegler,2011). Given the public outcry and emerging popular
pressures in response to the ﬁnancial crisis, recent efforts on the part of scholars to explain
regulatory change pay surprisingly little attention to newly mobilizing societal groups as
change agents. We therefore need a precise account of how diffuse interest groups were
able to confront the powerful ﬁnancial lobby to have their preferences met in regulatory
reforms in a more systematic manner.Following existing studies, I will show that the
ability of concentrated industry interests to affect either the policy agenda or the speciﬁc
content of regulatory rules has been weakened in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis, giving
political leverage to groups traditionally considered as ‘outsider groups’ to ﬁnance. The
causal mechanism is set in the post-crisis context which enhanced the capacity of actor
groups usually classiﬁed as weak to take advantage of the (temporary) disempowerment
of concentrated interests. I argue that small advocacy organizations have contributed to
policy-makers’ quest for more substantial reforms, by deploying expertise during
legislative debates and exploiting splits among industry groups. That meaningful
legislation is only enacted when a consumer interest coincides with a powerful producer
interest – so-called ‘Baptist-bootlegger’ coalitions – is a common assumption about
consumer protection politics.Although material resources matter, these kinds of mixed
alliances even out material advantages one group might have vis-à-vis another group
and therefore compensate for the weaker stance of public interest groups vis-à-vis
business(Baumgartner et al.,2009). Speciﬁcally, I examine coalition-building efforts
among countervailing interest groups as well as between these and policy-makers and
the inﬂuence of these relationships on policy reforms. In a recent study, Baumgartner
and Mahoney (2015)could show that policy-makers do not necessarily respond to the
Lisa Kastner4
resources of individual lobbying groups, but take into consideration the overall structure
of conﬂict and the likelihood of success of a policy solution. Policy-makers are not only
passively being lobbied but may become active policy advocates (‘legislative allies’)
themselves who join the efforts of groups with the same policy goals. The authors con-
ceptualize ‘lobbying groups and government ofﬁcials as parts of collective efforts to
move policy in one direction or another’ in so-called insider-outsider coalitions
(Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2015, p. 203). From this perspective the road to success is
gaining government allies with shared policy goals, and not, as many interest group
scholars have depicted it, outsider groups trying to lobby largely inactive government
ofﬁcials.
Regulatory Change and Group Inﬂuence
Table 1 summarizes the regulatory reforms chosen for analysis and lists their content with
respect to consumer relevance.
The Mortgage Credit Directive4 adopted by the Commission in February2014,
introduced for the ﬁrst time EU-wide rules in the area of mortgage loans.5 It
complemented the Consumer Credit Directiveof 2008, aimed at harmonizing consumer
protection regulations and promoting market integration for consumer credit, by applying
similar measures to mortgage loans. Prior to the crisis, no EU-wide legislation for home
loans existed, except for a voluntary code of conduct, a self-regulation regime on informa-
tion requirements, signed by the mortgage-lending industry and consumer groups in
2001. In the ﬁnal Directive, pro-reform advocates saw important parts of their demands
translated into policy. A general right for consumers to repay loans early, made it into
the ﬁnal Directive. To ensure that borrowers can meet their credit obligations, the
Table 1: Overview of the EU’s Legislative Initiatives (Consumer Finance Protection)
Regulatory Policy Reform measures in line with consumer groups’ demands
1 New supervisory structure
Directives on ESRB and ESFS
(September 2010), following
the de Larosière report
Transformation of level-3 Lamfalussy committees into
European Authorities in charge of micro-prudential
oversight and limited consumer protection mandate
(for example, right to ban harmful products).
2 Retail Financial Services
Mortgage Credit Directive
2014/17/EU (February 2014)
Introduces for the ﬁrst time EU-wide rules in the area
of mortgage loans, harmonizing and improving consumer
protection regulations across Europe.
3 Regulation for Packaged Retail
Investment Products (PRIPs)
(December 2014)
Improves investor protection by introducing a standardized
key information document (KID) for non-vanilla products
which are risky, difﬁcult to compare and complex to
understand to increase transparency and comparability
of products.
Source: Assembled by the author.
4 Mortgage Credit Directive 2014/17/EU (former EU Directive on responsible lending and borrowing, also referred to as
Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property, short CAARP).
5 Member States had to transpose its provisions into their national law by March2016.
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legislation also heightens creditworthiness assessment standards. The reform also
includes a general ban on tying practices where other ﬁnancial products are packaged
together with a credit agreement affecting consumers negatively, a provision not included
in the initial Commission proposal,6 and pushed for by consumer advocates (Interview
with a consumer advocate, Brussels, 21 May 2013). The Directive also introduces a
minimum standard for advice and curbs misleading advertising of mortgage credit and
creates an information requirement, in the form of a standardized information sheet
(ESIS) that can be compared across-borders and facilitates shopping around. Although
the new regulation does not ban loans in foreign currencies, as consumer groups had
demanded, it introduces additional consumer safeguards in order to protect consumers
against exchange rate risk, reﬂecting the proposition of The European Consumer
Organization (BEUC). Accordingly, the Directive was received positively by consumer
groups who considered consumer protection strengthened (BEUC,2013a). In contrast,
industry groups interviewed for this research project reported that their lobbying efforts
to prevent the Commission from focusing more on consumer protection than on
market integration had failed (Interview with a ﬁnancial industry lobbyist, Brussels,
13 May 2013).
A second legislative initiative under analysis here is a proposal for a Regulation for
Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPs) introducing a new key information
document (KID) for investors. The Commission introduced the proposal in July 2012,
in an effort to further tighten consumer protection and rebuild investor conﬁdence after
the ﬁnancial crisis. PRIPs are, simply put, investment products sold to retail customers.
Since the ﬁnancial crisis had shown that investment products were sold to costumers that
were ‘not right for them’, the aim of the legislation was to make risks of retail investment
products easier to understand and to increase comparability of different products
(European Commission,2012). As of autumn 2016, the regulation requires that
investment fund managers, insurers and banks provide consumers with a consumer-
friendly information document about the investment product they intend to buy. The
‘KID’ uses clear and plain language to allow retail customers to compare products before
they make an investment decision.While industry groups complained about more paper
work, Finance Watch, a leading civil society advocacy group, praised the legislation as
‘a win for consumer protection in Europe that could help to reduce misselling’(Finance
Watch,2014).
In an effort to address failures in supervision revealed by the crisis, one of the ﬁrst
legislative steps of decision-makers was to reform EU level supervisory structures, the
third case study under consideration here. The Commission put forward a legislative
proposal in September 2009, introducing major institutional innovations including three
new pan- European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in charge of micro-prudential
supervision. Within the new framework, consumer protection falls within the jurisdiction
of the three ESAs that work in tandem with the existing national supervisory authorities.
Advocates’ lobbying efforts to secure a strong consumer mandate for the new authorities
largely failed. Consumer groups and NGOs denounced the new ESAs for placing too little
6 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements relating to residential prop-
erty, 2011/0062 (COD), 31 March 2011. Available online at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%
208680%202011%20INIT.
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importance on consumer protection in their mandate as well as for the unbalanced
composition of their stakeholder groups (Interview with a representative of an NGO,
Brussels, 9 June 2011). In September 2011, BEUC submitted a complaint to the EU
Ombudsman about the under-representation of consumer advocates within the
stakeholder groups (BEUC,2011).
From the perspective of capture theories, where regulatory change depends upon the
means and the power of the ﬁnancial industry lobby to (re-)shape regulatory reform, we
would expect the outcome to reﬂect domestic ﬁnancial sector preferences. Although
overall consumer protection reforms were rather incremental and compromised solutions,
they nevertheless reﬂect certain policy alterations prompted by pro-reform advocates.
These results suggest that factors other than material resourcefulness may have actually
been decisive in these conﬂicts. A theoretical position that claims massive and ongoing
impact of business power appears difﬁcult to reconcile with this empirical evidence.
Taken together, then, there is good evidence against the prevailing argument in the IPE
literature that ﬁnancial industry groups massively inﬂuenced or ‘captured’ regulatory
reform. Why did diffuse consumer interests come to be reﬂected in some legislative
outcomes but not in others?
Contextual Conditions Underlying EU Financial Reforms7
The ﬁnancial crisis had considerably reshaped the context in which regulatory reform was
taking place. Increased salience in the post-crisis reform period was accompanied by a
deep legitimacy crisis of the ﬁnancial services industry. Whereas relations among
policy-makers and industry groups were previously described as ‘cozy’ or
‘symbiotic’(Tsingou,2008), the ﬁnancial crisis changed this interaction. Relations after
the crisis came under stress, marked by policy-makers’ reservation and even mistrust
vis-à-vis industry groups. In the perception of many policy-makers, ﬁnancial industry
groups were the culprits for the crisis. This perspective was clearly reﬂected in the
European Parliament’s resolution issued in July 2011 that ‘banks [...] also bear their share
of responsibility for the irresponsible lending practices [...].8 According to one industry
lobbyist: ‘We are perceived by policy makers as being responsible for the current crisis
which puts us in a difﬁcult position’ (Interview with a ﬁnancial industry lobbyist,
Brussels, 22 May 2013). The crisis had drastically changed the lobbying environment
in which ﬁnancial industry groups had to operate. Anecdotal evidence from interviews
with industry representatives in Brussels suggests that divisions among decision-makers
and ﬁnancial sector groups occurred with Commission ofﬁcials and MEPs giving industry
lobbyists ‘a very tough time’ (Interview with a ﬁnancial industry lobbyist, London, 17
June 2013). Communication levels seemed to have dropped signiﬁcantly with industry
representatives reporting that they found it often difﬁcult to get appointments with MEPs
(Interview with consumer advocate, Brussels, 1 June 2013).Industry groups felt that there
was considerable stigma notably among MEPs. One industry representative described the
7 This section is based on interviews with ﬁnancial industry lobbyists, conducted in Brussels and London in May and June
2013.
8 European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2011 on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (2010/2242(INI)). Available
online at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+ P7-TA-2011-0331 + 0 + DOC
+ PDF +V0//EN
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context of political debate in the EP as ‘bashing the banks’.In general, industry lobbyists
struggled to get access to the policy process, with changes to pre-crisis levels clearly
evident, as this interviewee put it, ‘it is not as nice as it was 15 years ago. It has become
more difﬁcultthan it was’.Divisions among decision-makers and industry groups became
increasingly visible when Commissioner Barnier asked his staff in December 2013 not to
accept any more meetings with ﬁnancial industry lobbyists for a certain period of time.
The instructions were clearly laid out in an email from the Directorate General for Internal
Market and Services (DG Markt), saying that ‘[i]n view of our workload and the sensitiv-
ity of our current dossier, until instructed otherwise Market DG employees should not
meet with bankers, their representatives or their associations’(Corporate Europe Observa-
tory, 2014b). Policy-makers generally also started to call the industry’s expertise into
question. A Commission ofﬁcial conﬁrmed that the interaction with ﬁnancial industry
groups had become ‘an adversarial relationship’ after the crisis. He reported that industry
groups had become ‘less a source of information but more of an adversary because [the
Commission] want[s] to change the way they do business’. With their reputation highly
damaged in light of the ﬁnancial meltdown, industry groups were put on the defensive
and started changing their lobbying strategies. Some private sector participants
interviewed for this project noted that they refrained from openly opposing or even
vetoing legislative proposals. These qualitative shifts in policy-making, albeit anecdotal,
indicate that ﬁnancial industry groups’ access to the policy-making process was curtailed
after the ﬁnancial crisis, thereby clearly reducing the sectors’ overall political inﬂuence.
These changes are important, since they suggest that the ﬁnancial lobby’s political
leverage had temporarily decreased. The next section will show that the retreat of the
industry opened-up new opportunities for alternative societal actors.In what follows
I describe some of the advocacy activities of diffuse interest groups surrounding each
of the policies under analysis, and document which of these were successful and which
were not. The focus here is on EU-based diffuse interest groups, the way they mobilized
and built pro-reform coalitions with governmental allies to induce desired changes in the
content of consumer ﬁnance protection reforms.
Case Study 1: European Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD)
The new MCD Directive consolidates legislation on EU level, essentially harmonizing
European mortgage regulations by setting the minimum regulatory requirements in a
consistent way across Member States. In response to a Commission’s consultation in
2009, industry groups strictly opposed new EU level mortgage regulations. Major
European level ﬁnancial industry associations including the European Banking Industry
Committee (EBIC), the European Mortgage Federation (EMF), and the European
Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB), as well as national associations such as the
Association of German Public Sector Banks (VÖB) started lobbying the Commission
on the Directive proposal before its issuance in March 2011 (Interview with ﬁnancial
industry lobbyist, Brussels, 13 May 2013). In an effort to avoid legislative action, banks
and mortgage lenders tried to lay out a different narrative arguing that the mortgage crisis
was speciﬁc to the US securitization system, a system of funding of mortgages not
widespread in Europe (Interviews with ﬁnancial industry lobbyists, Brussels 13, May
and 24 June). These lobbying efforts failed to prevent the Commission from introducing
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new binding rules for mortgage regulations. From the industry perspective the
Commission’ proposal marked a ‘conspicuous’ shift in regulatory focus ‘from internal
market integration towards more consumer protection issues’(Ahlswede,2011). Other
industry lobbyists conﬁrmed that their lobbying efforts to prevent the Commission from
focusing more on consumer protection than on market integration had failed and that they
‘certainly didn’t agree with this switch’.
Throughout the reform process, actor plurality was considerably increased compared
to pre-crisis levels with consumer advocates actively supporting regulatory change. About
30 per cent of groups that participated in the Commission’s public pre-legislative
consultation in June 2009 came from consumer advocacy groups, consumer and user
organizations as well as trade unions, about 20 per cent more groups than participated
in ﬁnancial sector consultations during pre-crisis times.9 National consumer associations
served as an important information transmitter about abusive practices in relation to
mortgage loans. The Commission noted that consumer advocates‘provided examples of
practices of unfair advertising and marketing’(European Commission,2009).
DG Markt under Commissioner Barnier became an important ally for diffuse interest
groups in pushing for reform despite objections of banks and mortgage lenders. The
Commission had discussed reforms related to mortgage integration well before the
ﬁnancial crisis, but DG Markt had refrained from introducing EU level legislation.Under
the leadership of Commissioner Barnier, the Commission came up with a new proposal
for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property(CARRP) addressing
‘irresponsible lending and borrowing practices’(European Commission,2011). The
objectives of the Commission proposal, ofﬁcially tabled in March 2011, were twofold.
It tried fostering consumer conﬁdence by enhancing consumer protection and driving
cross-border lending by introducing a maximum harmonization approach (Tait,2011).
Consumer groups, who generally favoured a broad scope of the Directive and a minimum
harmonization approach in order to preserve ‘already existing national consumer-friendly
legislation’(BEUC,2011) saw their demands largely reﬂected in the Commission
proposal.
In April 2011 legislative debate moved to the EP, where in particular MEPs of the
S&D and the Green Party became important channels through which consumer groups
could articulate their policy preferences. In July 2011 the ECON Rapporteur, Spanish
MEP Sánchez Presedo (S&D) issued his draft report which mainly differed in scope to
the Commission proposal. The report introduced several new articles to the Commission’s
initial proposal.Despite disagreements about details of the legislation, working relations
among consumer advocates and rapporteur were close throughout the legislative process.
The socialist rapporteur relied heavily on expertise provided by consumer advocates who
he regarded as close‘allies’ during reform debates (Interview, Brussels, 21 May 2013).
The ECON draft report was met with substantial criticism. Consumer and industry
groups agreed that the rapporteur addressed speciﬁc deﬁcits of the Spanish mortgage
market that were hardly transferable to the European level. Eventually, under pressure
from the ECON shadow rapporteurs as well as industry groups, the rapporteur
reduced the scope of the proposal. Subsequently, a ‘compromise mid-way’ between the
9 In a study on the sectoral origin of groups mobilizing on ﬁnancial sector consultations, Pagliari and Young (2012) found
that prior to the crisis less than 10 per cent of respondents represented non-ﬁnancial groups.
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‘big-bang-approach’ of the rapporteur and the ‘step-by-step approach’ of the Commission
was forged (Interview with Commission ofﬁcial, Brussels, 22 May 2013). In the compro-
mise position of the EP, provisions introduced by the ECON report had either been
deleted (such as the provision on portability of loans) or watered-down by industry
lobbying. Provisions that creditors should identify products that are not unsuitable for
the consumer and that EBA should develop guidelines for creditworthiness assessments
that were supported by the S&D and the Green Party had been deleted, in line with indus-
try preferences and after pressure from the EPP, ALDE and ECR groups (Giegold,2012).
While consumer advocates found support from the Commission and rapporteurs in the
EP, industry groups successfully lobbied their Member States in the Council as well as the
national MEPs to water down reform proposals. When the legislative debate moved to
trialogue stage in June 2012, Member States pushed for even greater watering down of
the new articles added by the EP. The ﬁnal text of the Directive had largely been reduced
to its narrow scope with the rapporteur’s added articles deleted or watered down
(Interview with ﬁnancial industry lobbyist, Brussels, 13 May 2013). Although industry
groups managed to water-down legislation, the reform outcomewas a settlement among
the various stakeholder groups involved. Consumers are being granted a general right
to early repayment but lenders are entitled to a compensation fee. The ﬁnal Directive
introduced Europe-wide standards for assessing the creditworthiness of mortgage
applicants, but in line with industry demands, the text of the initial proposal suggesting
an obligation for lenders to deny credit was deleted (European Commission, 2013). To
industry groups, the outcome was a compromise they ‘could live with’ (Interview with
ﬁnancial industry representative, 14 May 2013).
Case Study 2: Retail Investment Products (PRIPS/KID)
The European Institutions varied signiﬁcantly in their initial negotiating positions on the
KID regulation (Costermans,2014). The scope of the regulation was one of the most
controversially discussed items, with the EP promoting a wider scope and the Council
trying to reduce the scope, largely echoing the Commission proposal (Interview with
NGO representative, Brussels, 15 May 2013).In April 2014, EP and Council agreed the
ﬁnal text which came into force in December 2014.The agreement in trialogue largely
followed the EP’s consumer-friendly position, despite opposition of segments of the
ﬁnancial services industry. While pension funds had successfully lobbied for an
exemption, certain insurance products do fall within the scope of the KID. Reﬂecting
these changes to the initial Commission proposal, the ﬁnal regulation was named PRIIPs,
including not only ‘packaged retail,’ but also ‘insurance-based investment products.’
Opposition to the Commission proposal and subsequent EP amendments came from
the savings and co-operative banks that were not eager to implement another key informa-
tion document and complained about an obligation to provide more paperwork when
selling services. Insurance companies and pension funds lobbied Member States in the
Council to be excluded from the scope of the new PRIPS regulation (Johnson,2013).
These industry groups were clearly not in favour of the EP’s ambitious amendments
and extension of scope for the Directive, describing the parliamentary debate as ‘highly
political,’‘dangerous’ and marked by ‘miscomprehension of what the Commission idea
was’(Interview with industry representative, Brussels, 22 May 2013).
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The reform debate surrounding the PRIPS regulation illustrates how the policy
inﬂuence of diffuse interest groups can be boosted by powerful industry interests when
the two ﬁnd themselves on the same lobbying side. Industry groups werenot united in
their opposition to new regulations. The insurance sector was split, with British and Dutch
insurance companies supporting the creation of a level-playing ﬁeld through new
legislation and French and German companies strongly resisting the inclusion of
insurance products. ‘Baptist-bootlegger’ coalitions emerged among consumer groups
and the European fund industry against parts of the insurance sector. The larger scope
of the Directive was in line with the European fund industry which lobbied for more
regulation of the growing sector of retail structured products, in order to address a lack
of level playing ﬁeld across retail investment products (Interview with Commission
ofﬁcial, Brussels, 21 May 2013). The European fund industry was also supportive of
the introduction of a KID covering a wide range of investment products, including
pension funds and was largely aligned with consumer representatives in their support
for the Commission’s proposal to enhance investor protection (Interview with industry
representative, Brussels, 22 May 2013). A broad range of groups ranging from European
Investors and Users of Financial Services including EuroFinUse (European Federation of
Financial Services Users) to Financial Advisers, Asset Managers and Life Insurance
Companieswas in favour of the Commission’s proposal. In a joint press release of end
users and asset management industry in July 2012, groups expressed their full
support(CFA Institute,2012).
Pro-reform groups, including BEUC, Finance Watch, EuroFinUse and the Financial
Services Users Group (FSUG) at the European Commission generally supported the
Commission’s proposal aimed at enhancing investor protection by making the provision
of an information document about investment products mandatory. They advocated for
widening the scope, making the KID mandatory for all saving and investment products
and for life insurance and pensions to be within the scope of the proposal so that con-
sumers would be able to compare products across asset classes as well as within the same
asset class. In-depth discussions had already taken place among Finance Watch and Com-
mission ofﬁcials before the Commission published its legislative proposal in July 2012
(Interview with civil society representative, Brussels, 15 May 2013).Reform advocates
stepped up their lobbying efforts targeted at MEPs before the vote in plenary in Novem-
ber 2013. In May and June 2013, Finance Watch circulated mock-up Key Information
Documents showing how their reform suggestions could work in practice (Finance
Watch,2013). In November, BEUC, EuroFinUse and Finance Watch joined forces to
write a letter to members of the ECON Committee advocating for a wide scope of the
new regulation. The letter was followed with emails of the advocacy groups to all MEPs,
urging them to defend complexity labels. BEUC issued a press release, promoting a wide
scope of the regulation(BEUC,2013b).
Insider-outsider coalitions emerged with consumer advocates and MEPs pushing for
the same policy solutions. In the fall of 2012, meetings among Finance Watch staff and
the shadow rapporteurs for the PRIPs dossier took place, where advocates pushed for a
warning label and a wider scope. Rapporteur Bères (S&D) became an important ally
for advocacy groups promoting the consumer cause in the ECON Committee. As a result
of the team-like preparation of the legislation with MEPs and advocacy groups collaborat-
ing, all of the recommendations that had been brought to the table by Finance Watch were
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either taken up by the rapporteur’s draft report published in December 2012 or were pre-
sented as amendments by MEPs. Following advocates’ proposals, the rapporteur’s draft
report included a wide scope of the regulation, including stocks, bonds and bank
deposits as well as additional product rules (Interview with civil society representative,
Brussels, 15 May 2013).Echoing the suggestion by Finance Watch, the rapporteur also
included a provision on information about environmental, social and governance (ESG)
criteria in the KID. MEP Sharon Bowles (ALDE, UK), then chairwoman of the ECON
Committee, included a complexity label (or warning label) as suggested by Finance
Watch (Flood,2013b). Although the EP had been deeply divided over the PRIPs
regulation, and despite opposition of the EPP to extending the scope (Flood,2013a),
MEPs ﬁnally adopted the new regulation introducing a range of amendments to the initial
Commission draft.Advocates also saw a considerable part of theirpositions reﬂected in the
ﬁnal legislation, including a wider scope (including certain insurance products), a
warning label for certain investment products, enhanced disclosure of ﬁnancial advisor
fees and a provision for product issuers to substantiate claims about environmental and
social objectives of an investment product.10
Case Study 3: New European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
The new supervisory framework for ﬁnancial regulation in the EU came into force in
January 2011. The new supervisory authorities – European Banking Authority (EBA),
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – transformed and upgraded the existing
supervisory structure of three so-called Lamfalussy level 3 advisory committees
into ‘bodies with greater supervisory, rule-setting, and co-ordinating powers’
(Eisinget al.,2013). The ESAs have a mandate to protect consumers against abusive
practices, with consultative ‘Stakeholder Groups’ representing consumer associations
in all three organizations.11 Overall, the consumer protection mandate of the
ESAs remained limited. Stafﬁng levels are low and the ESAs have no competence to
impose binding rules on national regulators in the ﬁeld of consumer protection
(BEUC,2013c).
A European supervisory framework was opposed by parts of the ﬁnancial industry,
notably the German LBs, savings and co-operative banks, which reportedly inﬂuenced
the German position. German LBs tried to preserve their competitive advantage under
national supervision which provided a degree of protection from increased competition
under a single European supervisory framework (Buckley and Howarth,2010, p. 128).
Industry opposition to regulatory change was however not unanimous. Consumer
demands in favour of a move towards strengthened EU supervision were echoed by the
European fund industry who supported a harmonized European supervisory framework
with strong authorities (EurActive, 2010) as well as large German commercial banks
who expected lower compliance costs. During negotiations, neither the German nor the
French government could maintain their opposition to EU level supervision and had to
soften their position (Buckley and Howarth,2010, p. 128).
10 Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014.
11 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010.
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Consumer groups, including Consumers International, FIN-USE, BEUC, the
Federation of German Consumer Organizations, Which? and trade unions, got actively
engaged in the reform debate.12 The mobilization of diffuse interests and their
participation in the legislative process remained, however, limited with only 12 consumer
groups and trade unions participating in the public consultation, representing only about
13 per cent of consultation submissions. Consumer groups generally argued in favour of
one single European Authority in lieu of three different agencies to replace the
Lamfalussy committees to ensure strong co-operation among national regulators
(BEUC,2009). Consumer advocates preferred a single centralized European Financial
Regulatory Authority to set prudential standards, act as co-ordinator-supervisor for larger
EU-wide ﬁnancial institutions that represent systemic risk to the ﬁnancial system of the
EU, and set standards for valuing ﬁnancial assets (FIN-USE,2009). Modeled after the
US Dodd-Frank Bill, advocates also proposed to set up a pan-EU Consumer Protection
Agency along-side the new supervisory authorities. In response to the Commission
consultation, various consumer groups argued in favour of the creation of a consumer
regulator (a ‘European Financial Users Authority’) modeled after the American
Consumer Agency(see, for example,The Federation of German Consumer Organizations,
Vzbw,2009). Re-Deﬁne, a Brussels-based think tank suggested a consumer
regulator ‘with additional powers to enforce high levels of disclosure, good faith
transactions and strong and robust recourse against wrongdoers’ (Kapoor,2010).
However, during the negotiations, consumer groups had to soften their position to
advocate for a strong consumer mandate of the ESAs instead of an independent consumer
regulator (BEUC,2010).
The EP became an important ‘agent of change’, in support of strong supervisory
authorities with adequate ﬁnancial and human resources (Quaglia,2013, p. 59). While
Member States had considerably weakened the legislation, MEPs tried to restore the
initial Commission proposal and to further strengthen the statutory powers of the new
authorities (Brunsden,2010). Member States in the Council, in particular the UK,
France and Germany, were rather reluctant about transferring supervisory powers to
supranational authorities (Buckley and Howarth,2010, p. 127). The EP, on the contrary,
envisaged the new authorities as ‘watchdogs with a bite’, with the ability to write regula-
tory standards, to temporarily ban harmful products, to make legally binding decisions for
national ﬁnancial institutions and to require a review from the Commission every three
years that could potentially strengthen the supervisors even more by integrating them into
one supervisory body (European Parliament 2015). In plenary debate in Strasbourg in
September 2010, MEPs repeatedly warned against Council efforts to water down legisla-
tion and highlighted their support for a strong consumer protection mandate for the new
institutions. In particular, Green MEP Sven Giegold (German) became an important ally
for consumer groups pushing consumer-friendly legislation through the ECON
Committee as rapporteur for the legislation (Interview with NGO representative,
London 6 July 2011).Giegoldadded amendments reinforcing consumer protection,
notably by granting the ESAs the right to prohibit certain ﬁnancial products. In line with
demands of consumer groups, the EP also insisted on representatives from civil society in
12 See public submissions to the Commission consultation on European Financial Supervision in July 2009, available
online at: ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/ﬁn_supervision_en.htm.
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consultative stakeholder groups. Despite initial reluctance of Member States to transfer
regulatory powers to the supranational level, the EP successfully pushed for strengthened
supervisory authorities in the ﬁnal legislation (Quaglia, 2012, p. 187). In line with
preferences of the Member States, national regulators, however, mainly retained their
regulatory functions with regards to day-to-day supervision. The ﬁnal regulatory outcome
fell short of establishing authorities with a strong consumer mandate as envisioned by
pro-reform advocates.
Summarizing the Case Studies
This section summarizes the ﬁndings from the reform initiatives studied above. Analyzing
the introduction of new binding mortgage rules in the Mortgage Credit Directive, the
analysis demonstrates that private sector lobbying efforts aimed at preventing legislative
action failed. The ﬁnal reform legislation was a compromise with both lobbying sides –
consumer associations and industry groups – achieving some of their goals. In the second
study on the stricter regulations of retail investment products, I showed that consumer
groups were able to successfully push amendments through the EP and subsequent
trialogue negotiations, including warning labels for certain investment products and en-
hanced disclosure of fees. In contrast, consumer groups saw their demands ignored
concerning a consumer regulator modeled after the American consumer agency alongside
new authorities or to integrate the authorities under a strong centralized EU-level
supervisory body. The ﬁndings demonstrate the complexity of diffuse interest group
representation in ﬁnancial regulation. Advocacy success cannot be understood solely with
reference to favourable political opportunity structures or groups mobilization efforts. To
produce a favourable outcome to consumer interests, several factors had to play
together. The following elements can be considered necessary to produce a regulatory
outcome reﬂecting diffuse interest groups advocacy goals: (1) post-crisis conditions
weakened the ﬁnancial industry and increased political receptivity to pro-reform
demands, (2) diffuse interest groups mobilized in coalitions, deployed expertise and
exploited industry splits,and (3) found allies in Commissioner Barnier and rapporteurs
in the EP that actively pushed for policy change throughout legislative debates. The
comparison of the cases also reveals that the European Commission and Parliament,
rather than the Council, are instrumental in achieving consumer-friendly outcomes. MEPs
support for consumer protection policies can be explained by their motivation to portray
the EP as the institution representing citizens’ interests and as an ally of the general
public. In particular the S&D and the Green party proved to be receptive to the
preferences put forward by pro-reform groups, while MEPs of the EPP group were more
industry-friendly.
Conclusions
This article presents empirical evidence that in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis
legislators were keen to punish the ﬁnancial industry with new regulations. Although it
is difﬁcult to establish an independent causal role of NGO inﬂuence, the case studies
support the conclusion that consumer advocates became insiders of the reform process.
This is evidenced by various examples of measures initiated by NGOS, such as a ban
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on tying practices that was not included in the initial proposal of the Commission for a
Mortgage Credit Directive or warning labels for certain investment products and
enhanced disclosure of fees as in the case ofretail investment product regulation. The case
studies on the MCD and the PRIPS regulation show that the Commission and the pro-
reform forces within the European Parliament beneﬁted from NGOs as ‘legislative allies’
to push reforms through the legislative process. This alliance proved to be beneﬁcial to
Commissioner Barnier (in the case of the mortgage credit reform)as well as to the
rapporteurs in the EP in their efforts to push for reform in spite of industry opposition.
Consumer groups served an important source of expertise for both Commission
ofﬁcials and MEPs. This ﬁnding is best exempliﬁed by the team-like preparation of the
PRIPS legislation with MEPs eventually taking up all of Finance Watch’s policy
recommendations. In particular the more consumer-friendly S&D and the Green party
were able to take advantage of the increased civil society mobilization. Findings of the
case studies also suggest that diffuse interests’ success in the Parliament mainly hinges
on the rapporteurs because they have to steer the legislative proposals through the ECON
Committee and the plenary vote. Examples are the part played by Sven Giegold (Greens)
in securing amendments to strengthen the new European Supervisory Authorities by
granting them the right to prohibit certain ﬁnancial products and the work of Pervenche
Bères (S&D) in pushing through the amendments to the KID Regulation, as suggested
by pro-reform advocates. With respect to the reform of mortgage credit regulations, the
rapporteur Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D) prevented a watering-down of the
Commission proposal. Consumer protection measures were also strengthened when
industry opposition split and strange bedfellow coalitions emerged among consumer
advocates and the ﬁnancial services industry, as in the case of the KID Regulation, when
user representatives and European fund industry supported stricter EU regulations,
against the opposition of other industry groups. However, when key Member States
oppose a proposal, as in the case of the ESAs, NGO support of pro-reform forces within
the Commission and the Parliament has little to no effect.
What are the broader theoretical lessons that we can draw from the case
studies presented here? Findings are in line with Pagliari and Young’s (2014) observation
that enhanced actor plurality with more end users of ﬁnancial services, NGOs and
consumer organizations participating in the policy process reduces the dominance of
the industry voice during legislative debates. It reduces the risk of outright industry
capture and makes a more compromised legislative outcome, reﬂecting various
stakeholder preferences, more likely. The creation of Finance Watch in 2011 is one
example of a participatory mechanism for diffuse interest groups to systematically
increase actor plurality in regulatory decision-making by directly sponsoring an NGO
as a counterweight to industry. My case studies suggest that the new mechanisms
worked well to include a consumer and user perspective in post-crisis reform
debates. However, an important caveat is in order here: almost one decade after the
ﬁnancial crisis, the European Institutions’ engagement with civil society has started to
fade, as showcased by the Commission’s announcement in 2016 to curb funding for the
FSUG. There is one, albeit cynical, silver lining to this ﬁnding that civil society
mobilization therefore only temporarily curtailed regulatory capture: the crisis-prone
development of capitalism is likely to continue to generate conditions favourable to civil
society inﬂuence.
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